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VALUATION AND INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF FOREST ECOSYSTEMS:
PROSPECTS FOR A GLOBAL FOREST
AGREEMENT
Abstract Deforestation poses severe environmental problems for temperate and tropical
regions world-wide. An international forest agreement is necessary to protect these for-
ests. Previous international environmental agreements provide, at best, limited protection
for endangered natural resources. To conserve the world's forests, an effective forest
agreement must recognize the economic value of forest ecosystems. This forest agreement
should define a twofold rule of responsibility: that states have a duty to protect forests
located within their borders, and that other states that benefit from forests have a legal
obligation to share in conservation costs.
Deforestation is one of the world's most important environmental
problems.1 The endangered forests are both ecosystems within a
global biosphere and regions of human use and enjoyment.2 Airborne
pollutants such as acid rain threaten the very survival of forests
throughout much of Europe, the eastern United States and Canada.3
Urban encroachment, over-exploitation and conversion into timber
stands also threaten temperate forest ecosystems.4
Although international attention has focused on the need to protect
tropical forests, wetlands and other ecosystems,' no international
agreement protects northern temperate forests. By failing to recognize
environmental costs and non-timber forest values, market mechanisms
1. Kairiukstis, Forest Decline Background to the Problem, in FOREST DECLINE AND
REPRODUCTION: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CONSEQUENCES 3 (1987). See generally J.
BRUNNEE, ACID RAIN AND OzoNE LAYER DEPLETION: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
REGULATION (1988).
2. Ecosystems are complex and evolved interdependent communities of plant, animal and
microorganism species interacting with their environment. See generally THE TEMPERATE
FOREST ECOSYSTEM (Y. Hanxi, W. Zahn, J. Jeffers & P. Ward eds. 1986). Forest systems
recycle nutrients, recharge water and constitute habitat for a rich diversity of flora and fauna.
Forests remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, thereby mitigating global warming. Forests
also provide people with values and uses, including watersheds for fisheries and water supplies,
trees for timber and wood pulp, and environments for recreation, tourism, and spiritual and
aesthetic experiences. Forests are homelands for indigenous peoples. Thus, damage to forests
threatens both global ecological processes and human values that depend on sustainable forests.
See UNIFICATION OF EUROPEAN FOREST PATTERN RESEARCH (P. Schmidt, R. Oldeman & A.
Teller eds. 1989); WORLD DEFORESTATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (J. Richards & R.
Tucker eds. 1988).
3. See Kariukstis, supra note 1, at 3. Although not discussed here, air pollution severely
threatens temperate forests. See generally J. BRUNNEE, supra note 1; INVENTORYING AND
MONITORING ENDANGERED FoRESTs (P. Schmid-Haas ed. 1985).
4. See generally Jeffers, The Importance of Research in Temperate Forests, in THE
TEMPERATE FOREST ECOSYSTEM 9 (1986).
5. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
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hasten rather than slow deforestation. Thus, forest protection requires
regulatory policies and alternative methods of assessing forest values.
International economic pressures, uneven development of environ-
mental law, and the global impact of the forest crisis require interna-
tional regulation of forests. Because of interconnections among
tropical and temperate forest nations, a global agreement should pro-
tect the forests in both regions. International legal principles and
prior international agreements comprise the bases for international
environmental law applicable to forest regulation. International legal
principles address and define international environmental problems
and solutions. In contrast, international agreements legally bind par-
ties, creating both rights and obligations concerning the regulated
global resources.6 These existing principles and agreements, however,
are inadequate models on which to base an international forest agree-
ment. Therefore, this Comment suggests some of the general contours
and components of an effective international forest agreement.
I. FOREST CRISIS AND THE NEED FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Deforestation and the Need for Regulation
Despite the importance of forests as ecosystems and human environ-
ments, temperate nations continue to deplete their forests. The accel-
erated conversion of forests into timber occurs because the market
neither includes environmental costs in the price of timber production
nor recognizes the magnitude of non-market forest values. Valuation
methods exist, however, that would enable decisionmakers to measure
non-market forest values and more accurately weigh them in forest
policy decisions.
1. Transformation of Natural Forests into Timber Resources
Modern timber policies in temperate forest countries lead to the
conversion of vast areas of natural forest ecosystems into single-species
stands of trees.7 Timber companies clear-cut and deforest old growth
areas and then replant, grow and harvest valuable timber species of
6. Cf M. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1988) (treaties create legal
rights and duties). As used here, the term "global resources" refers to natural resources that
confer on the world substantial benefits, including environmental services, genetic diversity or
symbolic value.
7. Old-growth temperate forests in western Washington and Oregon, which once covered 6
million hectares, number only 2 million hectares, of which 400,000 hectares are reserved.
Franklin, Current Ecosystem Research Topics in the United States. in THE TEMPERATE FoREsT
ECOSYSTEM 55 (1986).
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trees.8 Although trees return to the area, the forest ecosystem
vanishes.9
The destruction of forest ecosystems eliminates other species of flora
and fauna and causes the loss of entire environmental systems.' °
Deforestation undermines watersheds, causing flooding, erosion, and
soil loss.11 Conversion to secondary forests releases substantial
amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.12 Moreover, defores-
tation interferes with recreation, aesthetic enjoyment and religion. 3
Ironically, this destruction of forest ecosystems occurs during a
period when the total area of temperate forest lands has actually
increased. 4 This increase, however, disguises the serious threat that
deforestation poses to northern forest ecosystems. Although increased
agricultural productivity enables reforestation of farmlands, such
processes do not replace the loss of native habitat and species due to
the clearing of original forests.15 Moreover, reforestation in one area
of a country or region merely offsets deforestation in another area.16
8. Any given area of secondary or plantation forest is more industrially productive than an
equal area of natural forest. See L CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
195-96 (1984); see also Szujecki, Pattern AnalysisforSilviculture, in UNIFICATION OF EUROPEAN
FoREsr PATrERN RESEARCH 62 (1989) (rational management limited to trees and not applied
to other components of the ecosystem).
9. Deforestation in the Pacific Northwest has been severe enough to stimulate federal
protection for the habitat of the endangered Northern Spotted Owl. See Hays, The New
Environmental Forest, 59 U. COLO. L. REv. 517, 532 (1988) (the government protects the owl
both for its value as a species and as an indicator of forest health).
10. d at 533 (conversion of forests to monocultures of trees threatens diversity).
11. Id at 526.
12. National Audubon Society, Draft for Discussion: Elements of a Global Forest Protocol
Within a Climate Treaty 2 n.1 (Jan. 1991).
13. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 461-63 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (timber harvests and road construction would devastate the site-specific
religion of Native Americans in northwest California).
14. Since 1975, total forest cover in Europe and Canada increased by 1.3% and 5.9%
respectively. WORLD RESOURCES INST., WORLD RESOURCES 268-69 (1990). Soviet Union
forests, comprising 25% of the world's timber and over half the world's conifers, increased in
area between 1961 and 1978, yet the increase may be attributable to different inventory methods.
Id at 126. Forest area in the United States, however, decreased 8.8% between 1975 and 1987.
Id at 268. Generally, temperate forest area has decreased by one-third since pre-agricutural
times. Id at 107.
15. See Jeffers, supra note 4.
16. In contrast to the eastern United States, forest inventories in the western United States
have declined because harvests of mature stands have exceeded growth on National Forest and
forest industry land on the Pacific Coast. E. RICHARDS, Fo.EsTRY AND THE FORESr
INDUSTRIES: PAST AND FUTURE 408 (1987).
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2. The Market Underprices Timber as a Commodity
Despite negative environmental impacts, deforestation continues at
an accelerated rate because market forces and policy makers fail to
include the effects of logging on forest ecosystems in the price of tim-
ber. 7 The marginal cost of production is lower than the marginal
social and environmental costs of production. 8 As a result, consum-
ers pay less for and consume more timber products than they would if
the market price included externality costs.' 9 Thus, underpriced tim-
ber increases consumption and accelerates deforestation.
3. Market Forces and Decisionmakers Overvalue Timber in
Relation to Non-market Forest Values
Although both market and forest policy underprice timber as a
commodity, they overvalue it as a forest use. Because most non-tim-
ber forest values are not priced in a market,2" decisionmakers and
market forces fail to recognize forest values other than timber. Con-
trary to national forest policies2' and popular preferences,2" this bias
toward timber production tilts policy decisions against environmental
services, wildlife habitat and other non-market forest values.2 3
4. Economic Valuation of Non-market Natural Resources
To overcome the bias against non-market values, valuation tech-
niques enable policy-makers to estimate the economic value of non-
market forest values and include them in the decisionmaking pro-
cess.24 Both resource economists and American law accept valuation
17. . BRUNNEE, supra note 1, at 53 (deterioration of terrestrial environments and diminution
of aesthetic values are production costs, but society, not the producer, generally bears them).
18. Id Treating forests as free goods also underestimates the real costs of airborne pollution,
and thus fails to provide incentives for pollution eradication. Brunnee discusses in depth the
treatment of resources as free goods in the context of airborne pollution.
19. See Williams, Benefit-Cost Analysis in Natural Resources Decision-making: An Economic
and Legal Overview, 11 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 761, 769 (1978).
20. See Price, Temperate Mountain Forests: Common-Pool Resources with Changing, Multiple
Outputs for Changing Communities, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 685, 688 (1990).
21. See Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960 § 529, 16 U.S.C.A. § 528 (West 1990) ("In
the administration of the national forests, due consideration shall be given to the relative values
of the various resources.").
22. See Hays, supra note 9, at 544 (net present benefit of environmental uses, especially
recreation, fishing, wildlife and wilderness exceeded that for commodity uses such as timber).
23. On the complexities of defining comparative forest values in policy decisions, see Price,
supra note 20, at 690.
24. See, e.g., Hays, supra note 9, at 544 (monetization of environmental values allows their
advocacy in the same terms as commodity values during the planning process); see also Navrud
& Solberg, Possible Regional Economic Consequences of Forest Dieback-Norway as an Example,
874
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techniques to measure three aspects of natural resource value: use
value, non-use value and replacement value.25
First, forest ecosystems comprise use values stemming from public
recreational activities such as hiking, fishing, wildlife observation and
tourism. 26 Second, forests provide non-use values that include exist-
ence. value, option value and intergenerational value.27 Existence
value assesses the value that people place on preserving a forest in its
current state, regardless of whether they physically use it.28  Option
value measures the economic value of retaining forests in their current
condition for future use.29 Non-use value also includes the value that
forest preservation has for future generations.30 Finally, replacement
value measures the costs of restoring a forest ecosystem to its
unharmed condition.31 Replacement value emphasizes restoration of
damaged resources rather than compensation to a party for the lost
use of those resources.32 Although no single valuation method, includ-
ing the market, measures all the environmental and economic aspects
of forests, valuation techniques enable decisionmakers to compare and
weigh diverse forest values.33
in FOREST DECLINE AND REPRODUCTION: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CONSEQUENCES 594
(1987).
25. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
§ 9651(c)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 (West 1990) (use value is a factor to be considered in resource
valuation); see also Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 476 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (contingent valuation can assess use and existence values for natural resource damages).
Contingent valuation measures the willingness to pay for a non-market value, based on surveys
that gauge economic preferences and impute market values to them. Id.
26. See Navrud & Solberg, supra note 24.
27. lit; cf Hays, supra note 9, at 527 (forest wilderness lands provide existence values).
28. See Navrud & Solberg, supra note 24, at 594. Existence values include aesthetic values
such as landscapes, symbolic value, biodiversity and biological value as part of the biosphere. Id
Non-use values include the value that people from other regions or nations place on a particular
forest ecosystem. See, eg., d'Arge & Kneese, State Liability for International Environmental
Degradation: An Economic Perspectiv 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 427, 442 (1980).
29. Option value includes the option for recreational activities in the future as well as the
value of preserving forests for future benefits presently unknown. Cf. Cross, Natural Resource
Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REv. 269, 286 (1989).
30. The United States Congress recognized such intergenerational obligations in the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4331(b) (West 1990) (Congress shall fulfill the
responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations).
31. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(noting a congressional preference for replacement value over diminution of use value because
replacement value is more conducive to conservation policy). Replacement costs may be
extensive. See iL at 454 (replacement damages include costs of restoration and the value of all
lost uses of the damaged resources).
32. Ia at 444.
33. The value of a forest ecosystem or any of its components may be the total of its market,
use and non-use values. See Cross, supra note 29, at 314.
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B. The Need for International Regulation of Forests
Although nations have developed legislative and economic tools to
discourage deforestation,34 participation in a global market under-
mines the effectiveness of national measures. First, even if all nations
wish to adopt a policy of including environmental costs in timber
prices, each may hesitate to act unilaterally because of international
economic pressures.35 For example, concern about balance of pay-
ments and balance of trade deficits create incentives to accelerate har-
vests in order to derive hard currency from timber exports. 6
Second, disparities among nations in environmental law and policy
create disincentives to protect forests fully.37 Nations can develop a
competitive advantage in timber production by not using sustainable
forest methods, thus underselling timber from other nations that
include environmental costs in their price.38 As a result, a nation can
reap the benefits of other nations' environmental activities while tak-
ing limited action at home.39 In effect, the failure to use sustainable
forestry methods creates artificially low timber export prices, amount-
ing to an unfair trade subsidy.'
Third, economic pressures and uneven environmental policies
among world regions also affect timber trade patterns and deforesta-
tion. Because most tropical timber nations underprice their timber,"1
temperate forest nations substitute tropical timber imports for domes-
tic production or temperate timber trade.42 Thus, temperate forest
34. See, e.g., National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-14 (West 1990).
35. See d'Arge & Kneese, supra note 28, at 434.
36. Id. at 445. The Soviet Union has begun to open the vast northern Siberian forest to
economic exploitation by the United States, Japan and others. Scientists believe the negative
effects on forests could dwarf what has happened in the tropics, endangering the cultures of
indigenous peoples and threatening the Siberian tiger with extinction. Seattle Times, Feb. 14,
1991, at A10, col. 1.
37. For similar reasons, the United States supported the Stockholm Declaration, infra note
51, to protect American economic interests placed at a potential disadvantage in international
markets due to domestic pollution control legislation. Springer, United States Environmental
Policy and International Law: Stockholm Principle 21 Revisited, in INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 49 (J. Carroll ed. 1988).
38. Non-sustainable forestry methods are underpriced because they fail to include
environmental externalities in the costs of production. Cf. supra note 18 and accompanying text.
39. Hahn & Richards, The Internationalization of Environmental Regulation, 30 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 421, 429 (1989). The advantages of waiting for others to act is known as the free rider
effect. See J. BRUNNEE, supra note 1, at 54.
40. See, e.g., M. JANIS, supra note 6, at 210 (subsidies include any form of import or price
support that operates directly or indirectly to increase exports).
41. Laarman, Export of Tropical Hardwoods, in WORLD DEFORESTATION IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 163 (1988).
42. See T. HPAY, THE INTERNATIONAL TROPICAL TIMBER AGREEMENT: ITS PROSPECTS
FOR TROPICAL TIMBER TRADE, DEVELOPMENT AND FOREST MANAGEMENT 5 (1985)
876
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nations shift the environmental consequences of timber production to
tropical forests.43 This uneven development of conservation policies
between the tropical and temperate forest regions causes an increase inimports of undervalued timber from relatively unprotected, and
thereby undervalued, forest areas.' Because of the international
nature of the problem, forest protection must occur on a global, rather
than a national, scale.
II. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Because of both the global ramifications of deforestation and the
inadequacy of national regulation, states need to use international
environmental law to protect forest ecosystems.45 States generally look
to international law for common rules, reciprocal constraints on harm-
ful behavior, or guidelines for achieving international goals.' To
accomplish these objectives, states develop international legal princi-
ples and binding international agreements.47
A. International Environmental Legal Principles
International environmental legal principles contained in declara-
tions, charters and resolutions address and define common problems
and goals.48 These principles create standards that guide national law
and provide conceptual frameworks for international agreements.49
International environmental legal principles, comprising a liability
model and a sustainable ecosystems model, form the basis for a pro-
spective international forest agreement.
(increasing substitution of tropical timber for end-uses which previously depended almost
entirely on temperate timber).
43. Laarman, supra note 41, at 160. The availability of imports makes the choice between
economic and non-economic forest uses less difficult. Cox, The North American-Japanese Timber
Trade: A Survey of its Social, Economic, and Environmental Impact, in WORLD DEFORESTATION
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 175 (1988). Japan is second only to Finland in its percentage of
forested land. Id. at 164. Japan, however, imports roughly half of the world's trade volume in
tropical hardwoods. Laarman, supra note 41, at 160.
44. T. Hpay, supra note 42, at 5.
45. International environmental law applies to ecological crises, including those arising
beyond the jurisdiction of one state, or those that, although localized, may be common to many
states and thus amenable to international cooperation. See L. CALDWELL, supra note 8, at 12.
46. M. JANis, supra note 6, at 7.
47. Id. at 36. When widespread state practices and policies conform to such principles, they
become binding as international customary law. See id at 44.
48. Birnie, The Role of International Law in Solving Certain Environmental Conflicts, in
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 99 (J. Carroll ed. 1988).
49. Id (such instruments have important normative effects); see also Hahn & Richards, supra
note 39. at 437.
877
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1. The Model of International Environmental Liability: The
Stockholm Declaration
The liability model for international environmental harm represents
a significant step in global environmental policy." As expressed in the
Stockholm Declaration of the 1972 United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment,"1 the liability model recognizes a state's sover-
eign right to exploit its resources. 2 The model, however, defines a
state's duty to prevent activities within its jurisdiction that cause envi-
ronmental harm beyond its borders. 3 Breach of this duty entitles
other states to receive damages for the resulting harm. 4 Although the
liability model defines international environmental duties, states main-
tain the option to perform those duties or pay damages.5
2. The Sustainable Ecosystems Model: The World Conservation
Strategy
The sustainable ecosystems model complements and surpasses the
liability model. As expressed in the World Conservation Strategy, 56
the sustainable ecosystems model encourages states to maintain essen-
tial ecological processes and life support systems, preserve genetic
diversity, and ensure the sustainable utilization of species and ecosys-
tems. In contrast to the liability model, the sustainable ecosystems
model articulates affirmative duties of protection, thereby emphasizing
environmental conservation over injury compensation.57
50. See Gray, The United Nations Environment Programme: An Assessment, 20 ENVTL. L.
291, 293 (1990).
51. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
52. States have the "sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction." Stockholm Declaration, supra note 51, Principle 21.
53. Id. (Principle 22 mandates that states shall cooperate to further international law
regarding liability and compensation for environmental damage).
54. See d'Arge & Kneese, supra note 28, at 430.
55. G. BINDER, TREATY CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CONTRADICTION: THE DIALECTIC OF
DUPLICITY 67 (1988).
56. In 1980, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(IUCN), in cooperation with the United Nations Environment Programme, World Wildlife
Fund, and United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization released the World
Conservation Strategy. See L. CALDWELL, supra note 8, at 271-72, 345 n.13 (quoting IUCN,
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM, AND THE WORLD WILDLIFE FEDERATION,
WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY: LIVING RESOURCE CONSERVATION FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT (1980)).
57. According to the Strategy, inadequate legislation and lack of awareness of the benefits of
conservation comprise some of the obstacles to achieving sustainable ecosystems. See L.
CALDWELL, supra note 8, at 272. In 1982, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
World Charter for Nature, affirming the need for sustainable ecosystems. The Charter warned
878
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B. International Environmental Agreements
Unlike international declarations, international agreements create
rights and obligations legally binding on states. 8 Based on the mutual
assent of the parties, 59 international agreements help create uniform
expectations through international rules and harmonize the national
laws of different nations."
1. International Agreements Concerning Global Resources Located
Within National Borders
Existing international environmental agreements provide an impor-
tant basis for international forest protection. They protect globally
significant natural resources located within national boundaries such
as wetlands habitat,6 ' sites of world heritage,62 endangered flora and
fauna,63 and tropical forests." These agreements rely on two distinct
policies to protect natural resources: land preservation65 and trade
regulation.66
The preservation approach seeks to protect internationally signifi-
cant resources from encroachment by setting aside natural reserves.67
against international security threats caused by scarce resources and urged that the law of each
state incorporate international environmental law. The World Charter for Nature, G.A.Res. 7,
36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/51 (1982), cited in Wood, The United
Nations World Charter for Nature" The Developing Nations' Initiative to Establish Protections for
the Environment, 12 ECOLOGy L.Q. 977, 992 (1985).
58. International agreements include treaties, conventions, protocols and accords. See M.
JANis, supra note 6, at 9.
59. National representatives, international officials and non-governmental organizations
negotiate the contours of an international agreement. The latter include international networks
of environmentalists, scientists, and trade groups that play a pivotal role in treaty initiation,
compliance, public education and technical assistance. See S. FIrZGERALD, INTERNATIONAL
WILDLIFE TRADE: WHosE BusINEss Is IT? 331 (1989). See generally L. CALDWELL, supra note
8, at 96-100;
60. M. ARSANANI, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF INTERNAL REsoURcEs 187 (1981).
61. Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat,
Feb. 2, 1971, -U.S.T.-, T.I.A.S. No. 11084, 996 U.N.T.S. 245 [hereinafter Ramsar]; see
Comment, An Analysis of Municipal Wetlands Laws and Their Relationship to the Convention on
Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar), 4 PACE ENVTL.
L. REv. 177, 179 (1986).
62. Convention For the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16,
1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, T.I.A.S. No. 8226, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter World Heritage].
63. Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].
64. See ag., T. HPAY, supra note 42.
65. Ramsar, supra note 61; World Heritage, supra note 62.
66. CITES, supra note 63; International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA), cited in T.
HPAY, supra note 42, at 1-2.
67. Ramsar seeks to protect wetlands, particularly those of international significance as
migratory fowl habitat. See Comment, supra note 61, at 206. World Heritage protects sites of
879
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States designate areas within their territory for inclusion in an interna-
tional list of protected sites.68 The agreements then legally obligate
each state to protect the listed sites within its territory.69 To further
promote cooperation, the agreements perform consultative or coordi-
native functions.70 Thus, the preservation approach relies on state
action, augmented by limited international cooperation, to protect
particular examples of globally significant resources.
Other international agreements seek to protect global resources
through trade regulation.71 International trade is a substantial factor
in the loss of species and ecosystems.72 To combat this loss, interna-
outstanding value that comprise part of humanity's common heritage. World Heritage, supra
note 62, at 153. Of the 47 World Heritage sites, those in the United States include Mammoth
Cave, Olympic, Grand Canyon, Redwood, Everglades and Yellowstone National Parks.
Edmonds, The Queensland Rainforest and Wetlands Conflict Australia's External Affairs
Power-Domestic Control and International Conservation, 20 ENVrL. L. 387, 404 (1990).
68. In Ramsar, states designate wetlands of significance, located within their borders, to the
list of special protection. See Ramsar, supra note 61 (article 2). In World Heritage, states
delineate areas within their territory for listing as protected Heritage sites. From these, the
World Heritage Committee selects and adds to the World Heritage List. See World Heritage,
supra note 62 (articles 11-13). Heritage criteria include outstanding examples of evolution,
superlative natural formations and significant natural habitat for flora and fauna. See Edmonds,
supra note 67, at 404.
69. See Comment, supra note 61, at 206; see also Edmonds, supra note 67, at 401-02. Other
binding legal duties include gathering and exchanging scientific research. See Comment, supra
note 61, at 206; see also Edmonds, supra note 67, at 401-02. World Heritage further defines
duties to save heritage for future generations and undertake active measures such as
comprehensive planning and public services to protect heritage sites. Id.
70. In Ramsar, states must consult other states when their activity affects wetlands common
to more than one state. See Ramsar, supra note 61 (article 5). The World Heritage Convention
maintains a coordinative body which provides administrative assistance to states. See Edmonds,
supra note 67, at 401.
71. CITES seeks to protect endangered species which are a source of aesthetic benefits,
medical products and environmental services to the world. See generally Heppes & McFadden,
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora:
Improving the Prospects for Preserving Our Biological Heritage, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 229 (1987).
The International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) seeks to protect the future of the tropical
timber trade and, increasingly, conserve forest ecosystems. See generally THE FUTURE OF THE
TROPICAL RAIN FOREST (M. McDermott ed. 1988). Tropical forests absorb carbon dioxide,
stabilize global climate, and contain 80% of the world's species, providing both genetic diversity
and products used world-wide in agriculture, medicine and industry. See, eg., Belson, Tropical
Deforestation and the Response of the United States Congress, 2 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. Rav. 111
(1989). Furthermore, tropical forests are home for indigenous peoples whose existence depends
on forest preservation. Ling, The Tropical Forestry Action Plan: People or Profits? A Response
from a Non-Governmental Perspective, in THE FUTURE OF THE TROPICAL RAIN FOREST 33 (M.
McDermott ed. 1988). Over half of the world's tropical forests have been destroyed in the last
four decades. Belson, supra, at 111.
72. See Heppes & McFadden, supra note 71, at 229; see also Glennon, Has International Law
Failed the Elephant?, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1990) (illegal killing of elephants for their ivory
reduced the African elephant population from 1.5 million to fewer than one-half million in the
last decade).
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tional agreements restrict trade in endangered species and their prod-
ucts. 73 For example, the International Tropical Timber Agreement,
through consultation and cooperation between importers and export-
ers, seeks to improve market information and thus discourage over-
harvesting and deforestation.74
Participation in trade regulation agreements is substantial.75 Fur-
thermore, the agreements recognize ongoing interests of both importer
and exporter states in decisions affecting international resources.76
Unlike the preservation approach, however, the trade regulation
approach seeks to protect global resources by regulating the trade
products of endangered species and habitat, and not the species and
habitat directly.77
III. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Existing international environmental law provides a necessary but
insufficient foundation for international forest regulation.78 The liabil-
ity and sustainable ecosystem models are inadequate legal principles
for international forest protection because they fail to combine preser-
vation duties with support duties. Likewise, existing conventions pro-
vide some of the legal bases for a forest agreement but lack the
necessary scope, legal obligations and valuation methods necessary for
73. See, ag., Kosloff & Trexler, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Speciev" Enforcement Theory and Practice in the United States 5 B.U. INV' LJ. 328 (1987)
(CITES "sets as its goal the prevention of the endangerment or extinction of species that could
result from international trade in those species and their products").
74. See T. HAY, supra note 42, at 5 (market intelligence could rationalize both the tropical
timber market and relations between the world's temperate and tropical timber markets).
75. CITES represents 103 states. Burns, CITES and the Regulation of International Trade in
Endangered Species of Flora: A Critical Appraisal 8 DICK. J. INT'L L. 203, 204 (1990). The
ITrA represents states that comprise 70.6% of global population, 82.7% of the world gross
domestic product of tropical timber, and over 95% of tropical timber imports. See T. HPAY,
supra note 42, at 1. Major importers include temperate timber producers such as Germany,
Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Soviet Union, Canada and the United States. Id. at 18.
76. See Bilder, InternationalLaw and NaturalResources Policies; 20 NAT. REsouRCES J. 451,
471 (1980).
77. See Heppes & McFadden, supra note 71, at 230 (the gravest danger to wildlife species is
loss of habitat). The ITTA, on the other hand, increasingly emphasizes conservation and
sustainable timber. The Tropical Forest Action Plan seeks to integrate forestry with other land
uses, develop forest-based local economies, and conserve tropical forest ecosystems. Ljungman,
The Tropical Forestry Action Plan, in THE FuTURE OF THE TROPICAL RAIN FORSr 20-21 (M.
McDermott ed. 1988).
78. See L. CALDWELI, supra note 8, at 280 (the Stockholm Declaration, World Conservation
Strategy and World Charter comprise "an international constitution for the world
environment"). Furthermore, to the extent such instruments guide national conduct, they
become binding as international customary law. Id,
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effective international forest regulation. Nonetheless, these principles
and agreements provide points of departure for new international
instruments that would effectively protect the world's forests.
A. Analysis of International Environmental Legal Principles
1. The Liability and Compensation Model of International
Environmental Harm: The Stockholm Declaration
Although the liability model, as expressed in the Stockholm Decla-
ration, defines state duties to prevent environmental harm, it ulti-
mately fails to resolve international environmental crises such as
deforestation. The liability model constitutes an important first step in
international environmental law. The model provides constraints on
the sovereign right to use natural resources destructively,79 and pro-
vides a mechanism to compensate for the harmful effects of breached
environmental duties."0 Nonetheless, the liability model fails to pro-
tect forests because of ill-defined responsibilities, the inadequacy of
damages, problems with apportionment, and narrowness of scope.
First, the liability model falls to provide clear guidelines for state
responsibility."1 Without a consensus about the nature of preventive
duties, emphasis focuses on after-the-fact damages.8 2 Second, dam-
ages fail to adequately compensate environmental harm that is unique,
lasting or non-restorable.8 3 Even when damages could make an envi-
ronmental injury whole, replacement costs may be so large that they
discourage compensation. 4 Third, the liability model faces difficulties
apportioning liability and damages for many environmental crises. 5
Disincentives for compensation and uncertainties about apportion-
ment increasingly create conflicts and undermine international
order.8 6 Fourth, the protection of forests and other global resources
involve issues other than harm and liability, such as the positive bene-
79. See M. ARSANJANI, supra note 60, at 70 (increasing demands made upon limited
resources have begun to restrict the sovereignty of states with regard to resources located within
their territorial boundaries).
80. See d'Arge & Kneese, supra note 28, at 429.
81. Id. at 430-31.
82. Brunnee, for example, distinguishes between longer-term, preventive policies and reactive,
curative measures. J. BRUNNEE, supra note 1, at 165.
83. See M. ARSANJANI, supra note 60, at 411.
84. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
85. For example, deforestation contributes to global warming and environmental harm but
the liability model fails to provide a mechanism to allocate relative shares of either liability or
damages. See, e.g., d'Arge & Kneese, supra note 28, at 431.
86. See, e.g., Fairclough, Global Environmental and Natural Resource Problems-Their
Economic, Political, and Security Implications, 14 WASH. Q. 81, 86 (1991) (global environmental
crises have increasingly strategic implications on a par with military and political crises).
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fits of environmental services, genetic diversity and common heri-
tage. 7 Accordingly, the liability model, by itself, is inadequate to
internationally regulate forests and other global resources.
2. Sustainable Ecosystems Model
Unlike the liability model, the sustainable ecosystems model articu-
lates guidelines for preventing environmental harm. 8 By focusing on
the international cooperation necessary to maintain essential ecologi-
cal processes, this model emphasizes the benefits of conservation
rather than injury compensation.89 Thus, the model suggests common
ground on which states could affirmatively cooperate to develop sus-
tainable ecosystems.
The sustainable ecosystem model, however, fails to articulate the
rights and duties of states concerning globally important ecosystems
located within national borders. The model provides that states
should preserve ecosystems, but it fails to address the support obliga-
tions of other states.' Thus, the model is inadequate because it fails to
define the affirmative duties of all states with interests in forest
regulation.
3. Alternative Model-Duties of States to Protect Global Resources
Modifying and combining aspects of the liability and sustainable
ecosystem models would enhance the effectiveness of international
environmental regulation. This alternative model would define the
legal duty of states to protect global resources, such as forest ecosys-
tems, that are located within their borders. This model would also
recognize the correlative right of other states to the preservation of
global resources.91
The duty to protect global resources creates mutual restrictions on
national sovereignty analogous to international servitudes. 92 Because
87. See, eg., Glennon, supra note 72, at 29 (quoting Caron, The Law of the Environment A
Symbolic Step of Modest Value. 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 528, 529 (1989)) ('[T]he notion of
legitimate interest seems to extend far beyond traditional notions of harm [to one of] preventing
the loss of species, the destruction of cultural heritage, and the waste of natural resources.").
88. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
89. I.d
90. See Glennon, supra note 72, at 35 (support obligations refer to the duties of other states to
contribute).
91. Because global warming affects everyone, all nations have an interest in preserving forests
in order to mitigate the green-house effect. See eg., Glennon, supra note 72, at 34-35 (nations
have an environmental right to expect that a global resource within another nation's borders will
be protected).
92. M. ARsANjANi, supra note 60, at 122 (a negative servitude exists where a nation limits its
rights to use resources located within its territory for the benefit of other nations).
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these servitudes confer substantial value on states that benefit from the
protection of global resources, those states should share in the conser-
vation CoStS. 9 3 Consequently, state obligations to protect global
resources within national borders should extend to outsider states as
well.9 4 Thus, the actual distribution of benefits from global resources
such as forests would determine the equitable allocation of preserva-
tion costs. 95
In practice, this alternative legal model would combine the duty of
states to conserve global resources within their borders with the
mutual responsibility of other states to share the preservation costs of
global resources. By using equitable considerations of costs and bene-
fits to allocate legal rights and obligations, this principle would create
economic incentives for states with interests in forests to restrict their
sovereignty, share conservation costs, and effectively protect forest
ecosystems.96
B. Analysis of International Agreements
The effectiveness of an international environmental agreement
improves substantially with the existence of previous related conven-
tions.97 Nonetheless, previous agreements provide, at best, limited
protection for international resources. Basic legal problems that affect
these instruments will likely confront an international forest agree-
ment. They include regulation of global resources located within
national borders, state responsibility for global resources, methods of
valuation and standards of fairness.
1. International Regulation of Global Resources Within National
Boundaries
Although existing agreements create affirmative legal duties to con-
serve globally significant resources, 98 inadequacies concerning the
93. See Glennon, supra note 72, at 34-35 (all nations have a duty to share in preserving global
environmental resources: nations with the resource have a "custodial obligation" and others have
"support obligations").
94. Id. at 34.
95. For example, the United States owes a duty to Japan to preserve American forests
because they are global resources that provide environmental services, biodiversity, and other
values. Japan, because it benefits from American forest values, owes a duty to reimburse the
United States for some of the costs of forest preservation. Likewise, the United States owes
support to Brazil and other tropical forest nations whose forests confer substantial benefits on the
United States.
96. Valuation techniques should assess the scope and magnitude of both the benefits and the
costs of ecosystem preservation. Cf. supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
97. See Hahn & Richards, supra note 39, at 433-34.
98. See supra note 68.
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scope of participation and the nature of the protected resource limit
the effectiveness of these legal instruments. First, the degree of inter-
national participation must be adequate to accomplish the goals of the
agreement. When the subject matter of a convention involves globally
significant resources, participation must be generally inclusive.99 For
example, representing all the major tropical timber importers and
exporters, the International Tropical Timber Agreement recognizes
that interests in tropical forests extend beyond tropical states." 0 Con-
versely, the absence of major powers from a global resources agree-
ment undermines its effectiveness.101 Because some states benefit from
the protection of global resources and others might gain a competitive
advantage from failing to conserve, widespread participation is neces-
sary to prevent the free rider effect."0 2
Second, the limited regulatory scope of current agreements under-
mines their effectiveness. Although habitat loss presents the gravest
danger to flora and fauna,103 the trade regulation approach regulates
trade products, not the underlying flora and fauna." States generally
favor trade regulation because it puts fewer constraints on their sover-
eign control over national resources. °1 Restricting protection of
global resources to regulation of their trade products, however, proves
ineffective because it fails to articulate affirmative state duties for pro-
tecting ecosystems.10 6
99. Cf M. ARSANjANI, supra note 60, at 39 ("The overriding policy is to permit and
encourage participation by all who can affect or be affected by the making of such decisions.").
100. See T. HPAY, supra note 42, at 2 (tropical timber requires a global resource management
perspective); see also Bilder, supra note 76, at 471 ("[llnternational commodity organizations
expressly recognize that both consumers and producers have interests in particular resources and
should share certain kinds of decisions.").
101. The absence of the Soviet Union and Japan from membership in the World Heritage
Convention, for example, narrows the scope and concept of world heritage protection. But see
Edmonds, supra note 67, at 402-03 n.77 (that only the Soviet Union, Belgium, Holland, and
Japan remain nonmembers indicates the Convention's breadth).
102. Hahn & Richards, supra note 39, at 429 (one nation benefiting from environmental
protection while refusing to take such action on its own).
103. See Heppes & McFadden, supra note 71, at 230.
104. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
105. Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 73, at 337.
106. The ineffectiveness of ITTA has forced it to modify the trade regulation approach and
take measures to sustain tropical forest ecosystems. See Ljungman, supra note 77, at 20-21 (the
Tropical Forest Action Plan includes conservation of forest ecosystems). On the other hand,
trade regulation can provide effective protection to species when illegal trafficking, not habitat
loss, endangers the species. See generally Glennon, supra note 72.
Washington Law Review Vol. 66:871, 1991
2. The Scope of State Duties to Protect Global Resources Within
National Borders
Even when international agreements specify affirmative state duties
to protect species and habitat,1 "7 they define the scope of those duties
too narrowly to be effective. Because current agreements protect par-
ticular sites rather than classes of habitat or ecosystems, conservation
is limited.' Substantial conservation of habitat requires setting aside
national territory in ways that infringe on powerful economic or polit-
ical interests." When states underestimate environmental threats
from the loss of natural resources and economic benefits from preser-
vation, they lack countervailing incentives to preserve wider areas of
habitat.
The lack of a duty to implement national legislation also reflects the
narrow scope of state obligations under previous agreements." 0 Fail-
ure to prescribe legislative requirements limits the availability of effec-
tive state regulatory mechanisms for the protection of global
resources."' Absent international coordination, states are less likely
to commit themselves to a comprehensive conservation policy112
3. Standards of Fairness
Inadequate or biased standards for apportioning rights and duties" 3
produce ineffective global agreements.' In order to induce wide-
spread participation, a global resources agreement must designate
107. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (discussion of the land preservation
approach).
108. See Comment, supra note 61, at 217 (not all wetlands can be saved by the protected areas
approach). This approach can be effective where the site itself, such as the Grand Canyon,
comprises the global resource. See World Heritage, supra note 62.
109. See Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 105, at 337.
110. Ramsar provides no guidelines for the implementation of national legislation for
wetlands protection. See Comment, supra note 61, at 216. Although the World Heritage
Convention requires states to adopt a general policy and to integrate protection of heritage into
comprehensive planning programs, its terms are general and merely aspirational. See supra note
62.
111. See Comment, supra note 61, at 216 (Ramsar should complement the protected areas
approach with consistent national land-use guidelines to promote the wise use of wetlands).
112. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
113. Standards of fairness refer to the principles by which an agreement apportions costs of
regulation. See J. BRUNNEE, supra note 1, at 64. For a discussion of different standards, see
Fairclough, supra note 86, at 92 (duties based on greatest wealth or responsibility for harm); see
also Bilder, supra note 76, at 467 (duties based on equality or need); d'Arge & Kneese, supra note
28, at 428 (duties based on polluter pays or victim pays principles).
114. In one inspection of six Latin American ITTA members, five nations had no operational
management policies for sustainable yield. McCarter, Session Four Discussion, in THE FUTURE
OF THE TROPICAL RAIN FOREST 84 (1988) (remarks of Tim Synnot, Oxford Forest Inst.).
ITTA's ineffectiveness is due, in part, to conflicts between tropical timber and industrialized
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state duties according to standards of fairness.11 Large regulatory
costs make perceptions that the agreement is fair especially impor-
tant.1' 6 The uneven distribution of environmental costs and benefits,
however, undermines perceptions of fairness.1 7 Moreover, each state
or region tends to urge a standard of fairness consistent with its own
interests.118 Thus, effective international cooperation requires stan-
dards of fairness," 9  but conflicting interests undermine such
standards.
4. Economic Valuation of Natural Resources
Existing international agreements undervalue natural resources,
thereby limiting their effectiveness.' 2 ° For example, one convention
narrowly focuses on waterfowl and fails to recognize other environ-
mental values, such as flood control and fisheries, which would induce
broader wetland protection.' 2 ' This inability to assess the full spec-
trum and magnitude of ecosystem values obscures the immediate eco-
nomic benefits of resource protection. Proper valuation, however,
would define the immediacy of a crisis, such as global deforestation, in
economic, as well as ecological, terms. Instead of viewing the cost of
environmental protection as economically prohibitive, valuation meth-
ods would reveal that failure to protect resources is economically
disastrous. 122
Because international environmental law is a relatively new and
dynamic area, distinctions between successful or insufficient agree-
ments are difficult to assess. On the one hand, many existing interna-
tional environmental agreements contain weak enforcement
states about the allocation of the costs and benefits of forest conservation. See Belson, supra note
71, at 157-58.
115. See Hahn & Richards, supra note 39, at 435.
116. Id
117. Id Protection of resources not only confers global benefits unevenly but also may confer
benefits on states other than those that bear the costs of conservation. For example, ITTA
tropical timber states maintain that they bear the costs of conservation and restrictions on
development while industrialized states enjoy the benefits of climate stabilization and other
tropical forest amenities. See also Belson, supra note 71, at 157-58.
118. See Bilder, supra note 76, at 467.
119. Supra note 114 and accompanying text; see also Bilder, supra note 76, at 485
(agreements are effective only if the parties see them as fair).
120. See Comment, supra note 61, at 217 (narrow focus on waterfowl habitat excluding other
wetland values).
121. Id. at 215.
122. Ramsar and CITES, like many international instruments, suffer from a lack of funding
that limits their effectiveness. See Burns, supra note 75, at 219-20 (CITES' custom inspection
system is plagued by personnel shortages and lack of training due to a meager budget); see also
Comment, supra note 61, at 215-16 (lack of funding causes problems in monitoring wetlands).
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mechanisms that threaten to make them mere tools of public rheto-
ric."' Even weak agreements, however, direct international attention
to the issue, bring pressure for compliance, and lay the foudation for
future agreements. 124
IV. PROPOSALS FOR ELEMENTS OF AN
INTERNATIONAL FOREST AGREEMENT
In order to overcome the ineffectiveness of prior agreements, an
international forest agreement must create new legal approaches to
international environmental problems. Although by no means compre-
hensive, the proposals below suggest constitutive elements of an inter-
national forest agreement that should facilitate its effectiveness.125
These proposals leave to governments and international or non-gov-
ernmental organizations1 26 the task of defining the precise institutional
form of an international forest agreement. 27 Regardless of the partic-
ular form, however, a forest agreement should comprise certain com-
ponents necessary to promote the effective international protection of
forests.
123. Hahn & Richards, supra note 39, at 437 (states may "reap the public image benefits of
signature without bearing the cost of implementation").
124. Id. at 438.
125. For example, funding, though not discussed here, should be commensurate with the
value of forest protection. Implementation costs for tropical forest preservation may be in the
tens of billions. Fairclough, supra note 86, at 95. Ideas for revenue sources include a carbon tax
proportional to carbon dioxide emissions and a trading system of pollution and conservation
credits. See National Audubon Society, supra note 12; see also J. BRuNNEE, supra note 1, at 64.
Likewise, monitoring of forests should assess threats to ecosystems and the efficacy of
international regulation. Monitoring should include shared international databases and satellite
mapping of the world's forests. See, eg., International Union for the Conservation of Nature
(IUCN) Proposed Global Forest Protocol 4 (on file with the Washington Law Review); President
Bush Proposal for Global Forestry Convention, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1084 (July 16,
1990) [hereinafter Bush Proposal]. See generally INVENTORYING AND MONrTORING
ENDANGERED FORESTS (P. Schmid-Haas ed. 1985).
126. Bush Proposal, supra note 125, at 2 (a forest convention could address threats to the
world's forests and could lead to positive action). The United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization supports negotiation of a forest convention by 1992. See Preparatory Committee
Draft, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 24 (Aug. 1990) (report of
Elizabeth May, Canadian delegate). For proposals by the National Audubon Society and IUCN,
see supra notes 12, 125.
127. The fundamental difference among other proposals is whether the forest agreement
should be a protocol of a climate or biodiversity convention. See, e.g., National Audubon
Society, supra note 12. But see Bush Proposal, supra note 125 (indicating preference for separate
convention).
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A. Global Significance of Forests
By defining forests as global resources, an international agreement
would correctly draw attention both to the global nature of the crisis
and the necessary scope of the legal solution.128 An international for-
est agreement should include all who benefit from forests.' 29 Further-
more, a global agreement should act as a trustee for future
generations' interests in contemporary forest preservation.130
The agreement should recognize that preservation of forest ecosys-
tems is necessary for sustainable forests and the continuation of bene-
fits from forest values and uses.' 3 ' Accordingly, the forest agreement
should set target dates for halting deforestation of natural tropical and
temperate forests.132  Furthermore, an agreement should increase
global forest area through afforestation that complements, rather than
converts, forest ecosystems. 33
The agreement should establish an international administrative
structure to implement the forest agreement. 34 Although some regu-
lation will be global, the international forest agreement should also
facilitate forest regulation at the regional, national and ecosystem
levels. 135
B. State Responsibility for Forest Ecosystems
An international forest agreement should obligate states to protect
forests located within their borders and require other states that bene-
128. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
129. The agreement should include representation of indigenous groups in protection
strategies. National Audubon Society, supra note 12. The agreement should also include island
and coastal nations that face the threat of rising seas caused by global warming. See, ag., May,
supra note 126, at 3 (global climate change threatens to increase sea level and destroy Pacific
Island nations).
130. See supra note 30.
131. Benefits include the mitigation of global warming, protection of watersheds, supply of
wood products, genetic diversity, indigenous homelands, recreation, scientific research, and
common heritage. See, eg., National Audubon Society, supra note 12 (forests provide ecological
and social benefits such as reduced soil erosion, protection of watersheds and coastal ecosystems,
and sequestration of carbon dioxide).
132. Id. (advocating an end to deforestation of primary forests by 2010 with an interim target
of 50% reduction by 2000, but sooner in nations with less than 15% of original natural forests).
133. Id; cf Bush Proposal, supra note 125 (committing to reforestation through planting one
billion trees per year in the United States but failing to affirm the protection of forest
ecosystems).
134. National Audubon Society, supra note 12 (create national planning process, establish
funding mechanisms, create an independent source of scientific information, and plan for
monitoring and enforcement).
135. Cf M. ARSANJANI, supra note 60, at 426-27 (global approach may require bilateral and
regional implementation).
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fit from forest protection to share conservation costs equitably. In
order to help enforce these binding legal duties and establish globally
uniform forest policies, the agreement should require states to adopt
national legislation consistent with the agreement. This will harmo-
nize the different national forest policies, limit economic incentives
that contribute to deforestation, 3 6 and provide a national dimension
to enforcement.1 37 Harmonized national laws should encourage glob-
ally consistent timber policies and mandate new forestry practices con-
ducive to sustainable ecosystems. The forest agreement should
promote uniform timber pricing policies that include externalities in
the costs of production, and thereby prevent deforestation from
becoming a short-term trade advantage.1 3 Furthermore, legislation
should carry out state obligations to support other states' forest con-
servation by mandating grants, technology and research transfers and
other economic support.
C. Standards of Fairness
Standards of fairness should correspond to the twofold legal duty of
forest protection: states must protect forests within their borders, and
other states that benefit from forest preservation must share in the sup-
port costs. 1 39 By applying fairness to both costs and benefits, no state
or region would bear an unfair burden: states would equitably share
both preservation costs and the benefits of forest protection. The for-
est agreement should modify this basic twofold principle of cost-allo-
cation with additional criteria, such as responsibility for airborne
pollution, ability to pay,"1 and rates of deforestation. 141 States should
explicitly negotiate and define such standards to avoid the ambiguities
and uncertainties otherwise likely to occur in an agreement involving
both diverse membership and large costs. 142
D. Valuation of Forest Ecosystems
The forest convention should use valuation techniques to measure
and compare all forest values and uses in order to include them in
136. See IUCN, supra note 125, at 4 (eliminate subsidies that contribute to deforestation).
137. See L. CALDWELL supra note 8, at 272 (according to the World Conservation Strategy,
obstacles to conservation include inadequate legislation and enforcement).
138. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
140. See Bilder, supra note 76, at 468 (rich nations should economically assist needy nations).
141. See Fairclough, supra note 86, at 92 (using an equitable basis of sharing costs that
corresponds to responsibility for the problem).
142. Id. at 95 (implementation of the Tropical Forest Action Plan alone may cost tens of
billions of dollars).
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decision-making processes. 143  The convention should quantify forest
values in order to assess the economic value of non-market forest qual-
ities, and recognize the immediate economic benefits of forest protec-
tion on both the national and international levels. 1" Valuation will
thus enable policy makers to weigh and prioritize forest values in
accord with ecological needs and changing preferences. An interna-
tional forest convention should use valuation methods to develop a
global inventory of forest ecosystems in order to weigh priorities for
preservation, biodiversity, indigenous homelands, environmental serv-
ices, timber production, and other values. Accordingly, valuation of
ecosystems should move beyond damage assessment and lay the basis
for a global forest accounting system.145
V. CONCLUSION
The destruction of temperate and tropical forest ecosystems severely
affects global environmental and economic processes. An interna-
tional agreement is necessary to protect the world's forests. Previous
agreements designed to protect global resources located within
national borders have proven to be of limited effectiveness. States per-
ceive conflicts between economic interests and conservation and fail to
undertake measures that they believe are incompatible with national
sovereignty. Thus, these agreements fail to provide adequate models
on which to base an international forest agreement.
Because forests are global resources, an international forest agree-
ment should represent and include the global community of states. A
twofold principle should guide the agreement: first, states have a legal
duty to protect forests located within their territory; and, second,
states that benefit from forests have a legal duty to share in the costs of
conservation. An international forest agreement should use valuation
143. Acceptance of valuation techniques should continue to increase following Ohio v.
United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
144. Benefits include biodiversity, ecosystem services, recreation, and existence or
preservation values. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text. By assessing the economic
value of ecosystem services and values, valuation would make the argument for forest
preservation even more compelling. See National Audubon Society, supra note 12.
145. Based on compiled forest information and valuation techniques, the convention should
develop an inventory of forests organized by ecosystem, endangered species, timber production,
forest uses and other indicia. Global accounting of forests would enable the convention to
evaluate the ecological and economic efficiency of international regulation as well as assess
threats to forests. An inventory would help determine national and global requirements for
carbon dioxide absorption, wood, wildlife habitat and other forest values. See IUCN, supra note
125, at 3 (an inventory could be a key element in negotiating obligations and targets); cf. Bush
Proposal, supra note 125 (viewing an inventory as a tool for analyzing new forest products and
uses).
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techniques to assess the economic value of forest ecosystems. Valua-
tion would thereby ensure that states recognize forest preservation as
both ecologically essential and economically compelling. Moreover,
valuation methods would enable states to calculate the costs and bene-
fits of forest protection and apportion them equitably among states.
Thus, although an international forest agreement will initially deter
global deforestation, it will also constitute a starting point for joint
international preservation and management of global forest
ecosystems.
Michael B. Saunders
